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Title: ‘A long, slow and painful road’: The Anglo-American alliance and the issue of cooperation with the USSR from Teheran to D-Day
Authors: Folly, M
Keywords: Second World War;Britain;United States;USSR;Teheran conference;Cooperation
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Citation: Diplomacy and Statecraft, 23(3), 471 - 492, 2012
Abstract: The Second World War Anglo–American alliance was less cohesive on the political side than the military. There were widening divergences between Britain and the United States with regard to the best way to handle co-operation with the Soviet Union during 1944. Some shared assumptions about the motivations of Soviet policy existed, but British and American policy-makers not only formulated different approaches, they consistently viewed their own to be more successful than those of their ally. There was an opportunity to co-ordinate polices during American Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius's mission to London in April 1944 but the fact that the issue was barely discussed is symptomatic of the situation. The British Foreign Office gained the backing of Winston Churchill in an attempt to forge ahead with pragmatic arrangements with the Russians. A satisfaction with their own efforts on both sides meant that the British and American bureaucracies made no serious and sustained attempt to co-ordinate their policies towards the Soviet Union through 1944, in contrast to the closeness of co-operation in other areas.
Description: This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published article is available from the link below. Copyright @ 2012 Taylor & Francis.
ISSN: 1557-301X
Appears in Collections:Dept of Politics, History and Law Research Papers

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