Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/993
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dc.contributor.authorKojima, N-
dc.coverage.spatial31en
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-06T13:26:32Z-
dc.date.available2007-07-06T13:26:32Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.citationEconomics and Finance Working papers, Brunel University, 05-07en
dc.identifier.urihttp://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/993-
dc.description.abstractThe present article considers the situation in which the buyer’s taste and budget are his private information. In this multi-dimensional setting, we study the optimal mechanism through a canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional context: a function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. In our multi-dimensional context, however, this is an indirect mechanism. We investigate the effectiveness and limit of this indirect mechanism in the framework of the revelation principle.en
dc.format.extent272820 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherBrunel Universityen
dc.subjectMulti-dimensional mechanism, indirect mechanism, budget constraint,en
dc.subjectrevelation principleen
dc.titleThe pricing mechanism to the buyer with a budget constraint and an indirect mechanismen
dc.typeResearch Paperen
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance
Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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