Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33481
Title: Welfare-improving tax disputes
Authors: Hashimzade, Nigar
Keywords: productive contest;rent-seeking;tax disputes;tax uncertainty
Issue Date: 13-Jul-2026
Publisher: Wiley
Citation: Hashimzade, N. (2026) 'Welfare-improving tax disputes', Journal of Public Economic Theory, 28 (4), e70124, pp. 1–13. doi: 10.1111/jpet.70124.
Abstract: Tax law is often uncertain. Taxpayers and tax authorities can disagree over the tax position, eligibility for tax incentives, or sufficiency of evidence. Taxpayers can face uncertainty over sanctions when tax position is not sustained. In many jurisdictions uncertain tax position can be disputed in court. In this paper, I present an analysis of tax dispute over uncertain tax treatment of investment in the framework of rent-seeking contest with endogenous prize. I show that in the presence of tax uncertainty, a tax dispute can lead to a net welfare gain despite the litigation costs. These results provide economic efficiency rationale for tax disputes.
Description: Data Availability Statement: Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.
URI: https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33481
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70124
ISSN: 1097-3923
Other Identifiers: ORCiD: Nigar Hashimzade https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2035-5020
Appears in Collections:Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting Research Papers *

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